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Abstract 
 
We analyse determinants of bank credit losses in Australasia. Despite sizeable credit losses over 
the past two decades, ours is the first systematic study to do so. Analysis is based on a 
comprehensive dataset retrieved from original financial reports of 32 Australasian banks (1980-
2005). Credit losses rise when the macro economy is weak. Asset markets, particularly the equity 
market, are also important. Larger banks provide more for credit losses while less efficient banks 
have greater asset quality problems. Strong loan growth translates into significantly higher credit 
losses with a lag of 2-4 years. Finally, the results show strong evidence of income smoothing 
activities by banks. 
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I Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, Australasian banks have been beset with episodes of major credit 
losses. Yet little is known about the systematic determinants of these losses. We analyse the 
nature of these determinants, providing the first comprehensive study of the drivers of credit 
losses in Australasian banking. 
 
The stability of the banking sector is of major importance for economic outcomes. Banks 
form the backbone of modern economies and instability in the banking sector can pose problems 
to the economic system as a whole. Credit losses, or more generally, asset quality problems have 
repeatedly been identified as the ultimate trigger of bank failures, e.g. in Graham & Horner 
(1988), Caprio & Klingebiel (1996). Agencies in charge of prudential supervision of the 
financial system as well as macroeconomic policymakers thus take a keen interest into the 
determinants of such losses. 
 
Research with data on the credit loss experience (CLE) of banks, in particular loan loss 
provisions, has traditionally focused on discretionary aspects when a bank’s management uses its 
discretion to set loan loss reserves. Seminal papers by Schreiner (1981) and Greenawalt & 
Sinkey (1988) have explored income smoothing activities of US banks by means of their loan-
loss provisions. The hypothesis is that banks engage in earnings management by reserving more 
in good times as a precaution for use in potentially leaner times ahead. Besides income 
smoothing, Lobo & Yang (2001) review evidence in the literature for three additional 
behavioural factors which influence the setting of loan loss reserves. These include signalling 
when a bank increases the loan loss provision to signal it is strong enough to absorb future 
potential losses, capital management in the context of meeting minimum capital requirements
1
 
and, finally, taxation aspects when loan loss provisions become a tax deductible expense. 
 
Most of the research above has focused on US banks but the development of the new Basel 
capital regime (Basel II) has motivated studies for other markets which take a more 
macroprudential perspective on credit losses.
2
 This paper analyses drivers of credit losses in 
                                                 
1
  Basel I capital adequacy rules allowed loan loss provisions, subject to certain upper limits, to be 
counted as a component of regulatory capital (BCBS, 1988, items 18-21, p. 5-6). Seminal work on this 
subject is by Moyer (1990, 3.1, p. 129-131) who explicitly posits capital management through loan 
loss provisions. 
 
2
  Cavallo & Majnoni (2001) and Bikker & Metzemakers (2003) use global samples and Valckx (2004) 
looks at loan loss provisioning in the EU. Country-specific research includes Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, & 
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Australasia. Our analysis is based on a comprehensive sample of bank specific credit loss data of 
32 Australasian banks for 1980 to 2005. Unlike most other studies, these data have been 
retrieved from original bank financial reports and not from external data providers (e.g. 
Bankscope). This has the advantage of more credit loss specific data items
3
 and, more 
importantly, it allows for extended time series covering the major crises which occurred in the 
Australian and New Zealand banking systems during the early 1990s. Parameter estimates 
gained with such long time series are more comprehensive than research studying the risk 
characteristics of the loan portfolio in the ‘normal’ course of business. In the words of 
Danielsson (2002), “market data are endogenous to market behaviour so statistical analysis made 
in times of stability does not provide much guidance in times of crisis”. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines the sample and provides some 
background information on the development of the Australasian banking system during the 
observation period. Section 3 introduces the methodology including the modelling approach and 
a discussion of the aggregate macro and bank-specific factors considered. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results for the overall sample as well as country-specific samples. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
II Background on Banks in Sample 
 
Results of this paper are based on a database of financial and credit loss information retrieved 
from original bank reports. The sample includes 23 Australian and 10 New Zealand banks (listed 
in Table 1 and Table 2) for the period 1980 to 2005. It essentially contains all registered banking 
firms operating during this time with activities in retail and/or rural banking but excludes (1) 
institutions that are predominantly wholesale and/or merchant banks and (2) non-bank financial 
institutions. 
 
Both the Australian and New Zealand banking systems have undergone major structural 
changes during this time span. The 1980s saw the initiation of major sector reforms (Campbell 
Inquiry, 1981 in Australia; Financial Policy Reform starting 1984 in New Zealand). The various 
types of financial institutions such as trading banks, savings banks, state banks, trust banks and 
building societies were initially subject to carefully delineated sets of legislation, but a 
substantial blurring between their activities had occurred. The liberalization of the financial 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pauer (2001) for Austria, Salas & Saurina (2002) for Spain, Pain (2003) for UK commercial and 
mortgage banks, Kearns (2004) for the leading Irish banks and Quagliariello (2004) for a 
comprehensive sample of Italian banks. 
3
  The database relies on approximately 55 raw data elements per institution, of which 12 are specifically 
related to the CLE of the bank. 
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system saw the creation of common rules for bank registration. The regulatory regime in the later 
half of the period is relatively ‘hands-off’ compared with a considerably more interventionist 
system early in the period.
4
  
 
The observation period covers the major banking system crises in both New Zealand and 
Australia which occurred in 1990/1991. In New Zealand, it culminated with the 1990 near 
collapse and subsequent government bail-out for Bank of New Zealand, the leading bank at the 
time. In Australia, the state banking system was affected by the 1991 demise of both the State 
Bank of South Australia (later absorbed into a predecessor of St. George Bank) and State Bank 
of Victoria (amalgamated into Commonwealth Bank of Australia). Other Australian banking 
firms also suffered greatly during these years, most notably market leader Westpac which paid 
the price for its involvement in some high profile commercial real estate projects.
5
  
 
The fallout of the system crises led to a substantial re-shaping of the banking scene. 
Central and state government owned institutions were all privatized and in most cases later 
absorbed into other banks. Australia’s banking market concentration saw the emergence of four 
leading banking groups (ANZ, Commonwealth Bank, NAB and Westpac). Similarly, four 
banking groups ANZ-National, ASB, BNZ and Westpac now hold the bulk of system assets in 
New Zealand, each of them controlled by one of the major Australian banks. 
 
Table 3 provides supplemental dynamic information on the banks in the sample. The 
number of banks in the sample varies from 13 for 1980 to 28 banks for 1989 and 1990. The 
concentration in the banking system has since then led to a decline to just 16 institutions in the 
sample for the years 2004 and 2005. The asset size information provided in Table 3 moreover 
illustrates the substantial difference between the largest and smallest bank included in the sample 
in any particular year. In the case of Australia, for example, the smallest institution typically 
holds less than 1% of the largest bank’s assets. 
                                                 
4
  References for a description of this transformation process are Wallis Inquiry (1997, p. 567-597) and 
Davis (2004, p. 9-15) for Australia; Grimes (1998) for New Zealand. 
 
5
  Westpac’s cumulative write-offs from 1990 to 1993 represented about 8% of loans outstanding. See 
Carew (1997) and Davidson & Salisbury (2005) for an account of Westpac’s crisis. 
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Table 1. Overview of banks in database (Australia) 
Bank identifier Bank full name Institution earlier name Successor Registered Data range
AU AdelaideBk Adelaide Bank Co-operative Building Society of 
South Australia
1994 to present 1988-2005
AU AdvanceBk Advance Bank NSW Building Society AU StGeorge 1985 to 1998 1986-1996
AU ANZ ANZ Banking Group 
(AUS)
whole period 1979-2005
AU BendigoBk Bendigo Bank 1995 to present 1991-2005
AU BkMelbourne Bank of Melbourne RESI Statewide Building Society AU Westpac 1989-1998 1998-1996
AU BkWest Bank West / HBOS 
Australia
Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia
HBOS Australia whole period 1983-2005
AU BoQ Bank of Queensland whole period 1980-2005
AU CBC Sydney Commercial Banking 
Company of Sydney 
Limited
AU NAB to 1982 1979-1981
AU ChallengeBk Challenge Bank Hotham Permanent Building Society 
(Vic)/ Perth Building
AU Westpac 1987 to 1996 1987-1995
AU Colonial* Colonial / Colonial State 
Bank
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society
AU CoWthBk 1996 to 2001 1996-1999
AU CommBk Commercial Bank of 
Australia
AU Westpac to 1982 1979-1981
AU CoWthBk Commonwealth Bank whole period 1979-2005
AU EldersRural Elders Rural Bank Limited 2000 to present 1999-2005
AU NAB National Australia Bank National Bank of Australasia whole period 1979-2005
AU PIBA Primary Industry Bank of 
Australia
Rabobank 
Australia
1987 to 2003 1979-1993
AU SBNSW* State Bank of New South 
Wales
Rural Bank of New South Wales AU Colonial to 1995 1980-1995
AU SBSA State Bank of South 
Australia
The State Bank of South Australia AU Advance Bk to 1994 1980-1994
AU SBVictoria State Bank of Victoria AU CoWthBk to 1991 1979-1990
AU StGeorge St.George Bank St.George Building Society 1993 to present 1989-2005
AU SuncorpMet Suncorp-Metway, Suncorp 
after 2002
Metway Bank renamed 
Suncorp in 2002
1988 to present 1991-2005
AU TasmaniaBk Tasmania Bank Statewide Bank (Launceston Bank 
for Savings), The Tasmanian 
Permanent Building Society 
AU Trustbk 
TAS
to 1991 1984-1990
AU Trustbk TAS Trust Bank Tasmania SBT Bank (The Savings Bank of 
Tasmania), Hobart Savings Bank
AU CoWthBk to 1999 1983-1999
AU Westpac Westpac (AUS) Bank of New South Wales whole period 1979-2005  
* AU SBNSW and successor AU Colonial are treated as one time series in this empirical research. 
 
Table 2.  Overview of banks in database (New Zealand) 
Bank identifier Bank full name Insitution earlier name Successor Registered Data range
NZ ANZ ANZ National Bank ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) 
until 2004
whole period 1980-2005
NZ ASB ASB Ltd. Auckland Savings Bank 1989 to present 1983-2005
NZ BNZ Bank of New Zealand whole period 1979-2005
NZ Countrywide Countrywide Bank Countrywide Building Society NZ NBNZ 1987 to 1998 1983-1998
NZ NBNZ National Bank of New 
Zealand
NZ ANZ to 2004 1979-2003
NZ Rural Bank Rural Bank Rural Banking and Finance 
Corporation of New Zealand
NZ NBNZ 1990 to 1994 1984-1992
NZ Trust Bank Trust Bank NZ Trustee Bank Group NZ Westpac 1989 to 1996 1988-1996
NZ TSB Bank TSB Bank Taranaki Savings Bank 1989 to present 1987-2005
NZ UnitedBK United Bank United Building Society NZ Countrywide 1990 to 1994 1983-1992
NZ Westpac Westpac Banking Corp. 
(NZ)
Bank of New South Wales whole period 1987-2005
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Table 3. Summary asset size information on banks in sample 
Australian banks
Year: 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
||||||||||
|||||||||||
||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
|||||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
Total banks 10 11 10 11 13 15 16 17 17 18 18 17 17 17 16 16 13 12 12 13 11 11 11 11 11 11
Total assets of 
banks in sample 
(AUD bil) 75 89 107 122 158 194 245 286 346 420 469 467 488 508 513 571 607 687 786 808 1013 1103 1138 1246 1412 1525
Average assets per 
bank 
(AUD bil) 7.5 8.1 10.7 11.1 12.1 12.9 15.3 16.8 20.4 23.3 26.1 27.4 28.7 29.9 32.1 35.7 46.7 57.2 65.5 62.1 92.1 100.3 103.4 113.2 128.4 138.6
Assets smallest 
bank (AUD bil) 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.46 0.60 0.71 0.72 1.17 1.33 1.55 1.68 1.80 1.95 2.11 0.40 0.74 1.05 1.31 1.81 2.08 2.62
Assets largest bank 
(AUD bil) 17.9 20.1 31.3 34.5 40.4 49.1 60.7 70.3 84.6 108.6 107.0 106.0 110.9 118.0 130.4 148.1 173.7 202.0 251.7 254.1 343.7 374.7 377.4 397.5 411.3 419.6
New Zealand banks
Year: 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
||| |||
||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
|||||||
|||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
|||||
|||||
Total banks 3 3 6 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5
Total assets of 
banks in sample 
(NZD bil) 8.3 9.8 12.9 18.6 23.5 32.9 41.2 49.4 49.2 56.2 62.0 66.9 73.7 78.1 83.8 94.0 104.3 112.1 125.0 131.3 147.4 161.3 165.7 178.9 191.4 215.7
Average assets per 
bank 
(NZD bil) 2.8 3.3 2.2 2.3 2.9 3.3 4.1 4.9 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.7 7.4 9.8 10.5 11.8 14.9 16.0 20.8 21.9 24.6 26.9 27.6 29.8 38.3 43.1
Assets smallest 
bank (NZD bil) 1.81 2.23 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.74 0.88 1.10 1.21 1.42 1.63 1.83 2.06 2.34 2.60
Assets largest bank 
(NZD bil) 4.6 5.3 6.3 6.7 8.6 11.2 13.5 16.7 15.4 18.0 19.6 20.7 19.8 19.0 19.3 22.0 26.4 27.5 29.3 31.0 35.3 38.2 38.9 42.3 74.2 85.3  
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III The Model 
 
In line with comparable macro-prudential literature, we adopt a reduced form pooled regression 
approach to explaining banks’ credit losses. We choose impaired asset expense as a percentage of 
loans (IAE_LN) as our dependent variable. This variable is the proxy most widely used in 
literature
6
 and is available for most banks throughout the observation period. IAE_LN may not 
precisely reflect actual credit losses in an ex-post analysis, i.e. in view of subsequent write-offs 
and recoveries. It gives, however, a timely indication of credit events without the delays observed 
for definite asset derecognitions (write-offs). We hypothesise that credit losses will reflect 
developments in both macroeconomic factors and bank-specific characteristics. We incorporate 
proxies for each of these sets of developments, but do not model the precise mechanism by which 
these proxies affect credit losses. One advantage of this approach is the possibility to include a 
range of explanatory variables whose actions on the dependent variable may be complex and 
indirect. Aggregate (macro) variables that are included in the study are summarised in Table 4; 
bank-specific factors are summarised in Table 5. Summary statistics for both categories of 
factors are shown in Table 6, respectively Table 7. 
 
Aggregate variables comprise state of the economy indicators, GDP growth (GDPGRW) 
and the level and change in the rate of unemployment (UNEMP and ΔUNEMP); movements in 
these macro variables are likely to affect asset quality and ability of borrowers to service loans. 
While GDPGRW and changes in unemployment (ΔUNEMP) are proxies for economic cycles, 
UNEMP can provide an indication for the presence of structural problems. GDPGRW and 
ΔUNEMP are highly negatively correlated for both the Australian and New Zealand series and 
thus measure similar effects;
7
 we therefore do not include them jointly in the same regression. 
 
There are a number of factors which can be subsumed as ‘asset price shock proxies’. 
Sudden price changes in key asset classes such as property and shares may weaken borrowers’ 
ability to service debt and reduce the value of collateral held by banks. Moreover, Pain (2003, p. 
21) argues that sharp changes in asset prices may be associated with increased fragility of 
borrowers through more traditional macroeconomic channels. For example, swift increases in 
interest rates can lead to cash-flow problems in both the corporate and household sectors, which 
in turn can lead to borrower default. 
                                                 
6
  Impaired asset expense represents management’s estimate for the period’s credit losses. Because most 
impaired assets will be related to lending, impaired asset expense will typically be very close to loan 
loss provision expense, a term used in most literature.  
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Our basic model formulation includes the return on the national share index 
(RET_SHINDX) and the changes in the housing price index (HPGRW) as asset shock variables. 
Point changes in nominal 3-month interest rates showed some explanatory power in preliminary 
work, but note that nominal interest rates are a linear combination of real interest rates and CPI 
inflation (CPIGRW). Point changes in real interest rates were found to possess no explanatory 
power in these preliminary tests (and were thus omitted),
8
 but we do include the effect of CPI 
inflation as an additional proxy. CPIGRW may have ambiguous effects on a bank’s CLE since a 
rise in CPIGRW raises nominal interest rates, placing greater strains on debt servicing, while 
increasing asset values (but not liability values) so improving solvency of borrowers. 
 
The first group of bank-specific proxies in Table 5 mainly controls for institution specific 
characteristics in this heterogeneous sample of banks ranging from small regional mortgage 
lenders to multi-line internationally diversified institutions. SH_SYSLNS, defined as the bank’s 
share of total private sector credit, is the primary size proxy, indicative of both risk 
diversification and market power of banks. Its expected sign is uncertain since better diversified 
banks might face lower credit losses but at the same time be tempted into higher risk lines of 
business. There is moreover the market power hypothesis which postulates that monopolistic 
market structure promotes lending by larger banks to young firms which then leads to higher 
credit losses (Petersen & Rajan, 1995). 
 
Ideally, our model should include proxies directly measuring the risk characteristics of the 
loan portfolio, i.e. the exposure to certain lending categories. Unfortunately such information is 
not consistently disclosed by all banks throughout the observation period and some 
standardization of risk classes was only brought about by the Basel I Capital Accord (BCBS, 
1988a). Such proxies (for instance the share of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s loan 
portfolio) can thus only be employed for empirical modeling with data after 1990. 
 
The net interest margin, NIM, is nevertheless a partial measure of a bank’s risk and 
operational characteristics. Wider margins are typically associated with a strong retail focus and 
reliance on balance sheet business. In particular, gross funding costs of retail deposits (before 
operating expenses required to originate them) are lower. Such institutions often focus on 
residential lending for which one expects comparably lower credit losses (negative coefficient). 
Alternatively, a high interest margin may reflect a bank’s deliberate choice to lend to more risky 
                                                                                                                                                              
7
  The correlation is -81% for the Australian series and -61% for the New Zealand series. 
8
 Note that real interest rate changes have moderate correlations with the economic state variable 
GDPGRW (Australia: +50%*, NZ: +37%; *significant at 5% level). 
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borrowers (positive coefficient). Pain (2003, Table 5, p. 24) has moreover argued that there is a 
potential for lower past margins to induce greater risk-taking by banks. 
 
Bank-specific factors in Table 5 include a proxy for a bank’s growth. There is anecdotal 
evidence confirmed by some empirical studies (e.g. Clair, 1992) that banks expanding (too) 
rapidly are faced with elevated credit losses in subsequent years. In order to gain market share, 
such institutions may loosen lending criteria but are not able to accurately appraise required 
provision at the time. Our measure is actual bank asset percentage growth, ASGRW.
9
 Up to 4 
(annual) lags of the asset growth variable are included in the regression because the implications 
of ‘reckless’ lending in times of strong expansion might not become apparent for some time. 
 
Monitoring of borrowers is a key element of an effective credit policy. Berger & De Young 
(1997) employ Granger-causality techniques to test effects of cost efficiencies on subsequent 
loan losses. They find that measured cost efficiency precedes reductions in problem loans and 
thus conclude that “cost efficiency may be an important indicator of future problem loans and 
problem banks”. Accordingly, inefficient banks would be expected to suffer greater credit losses. 
Alternatively, one can argue such banks could maintain an extensive credit evaluation procedure 
and will thus exhibit lower credit losses. The cost-income ratio (CIR) is chosen as the cost 
efficiency proxy.
10
   
 
Smoothing reported income by means of discretionary provisions was explored by 
(Greenawalt & Sinkey Jr., 1988). Based on analytical results by Fudenberg & Tirole (1995), we 
hypothesise that management in banks with good (poor) current performance relative to future 
performance will ‘save’ income for (’borrow’ income from) the future by reducing (increasing) 
current income through loan loss provisions (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003). This 
hypothesis would thus call for positive coefficients of an earnings proxy. We include earnings 
                                                 
9
  It can be argued that relative growth differentials are more relevant because strong growth in times of 
economic expansion might be in line with the general economy. Accordingly, we defined a second 
growth proxy, DVLNGRW, as the point difference of a bank’s loan growth rate from the growth rate 
of the overall system (growth in total private sector credit PSC). ASGRW and DVLNGRW correlate 
very closely (92%) and can thus not be included jointly in the same regression, and we use just 
ASGRW. 
 
10
  CIR is defined as non-interest expense (operational expense) over total operating income (net interest 
income plus other operating income). It is widely used by practitioners and in comparable CLE studies 
such as Pain (2003) and Salas & Saurina (2002). Note, however, that CIR is quite contentious for 
efficiency studies in banking; see, for example, the discussion in Hess & Francis (2004). 
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before taxes and loan loss provisions over average total assets (EBTP_AS) as an explanatory 
variable to control for this behavioural influence on provisioning levels.
11
 
 
Our full model incorporating both the aggregate and bank-specific variables is shown as 
Equation 1. For all variables other than the share of system loans (SH_SYSLNS) and asset 
growth (ASGRW), we include current and two lagged values of each variable to capture the 
dynamics of CLE experiences in response to the relevant variables. We include four lags of 
ASGRW given our hypothesis that poor lending as a result of aggressive market share growth 
may only become apparent after a material interval has lapsed. Only the contemporaneous value 
of SH_SYSLNS is included since changes in bank size are captured with the ASGRW parameter. 
  
Equation 1 Basic model form 
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where IAE_LNi,t is the CLE variable impaired asset expense as a percentage of loans for bank i in 
year t; the explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equation are explained in Table 4 
and Table 5. 
 
                                                 
11
  This approach to earnings proxy modelling (using average assets) is widely used in the relevant 
literature, e.g. in Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas (1999) and, more recently, Kearns (2004). 
Alternative 
macro factors 
Alternative asset 
shock proxies 
Misc. bank-
specific proxies
Asset growth 
proxy (bank-
specific) 
Macro/finance 
factor 
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Table 4. Grouping of drivers of a bank’s CLE into functional groups: macro variables 
Functional group Regressor Acronym Expected sign
State of the economy 
(cycles, structural) 
Real GDP growth GDPGRW -ve 
Unemployment rate (level, change) UNEMP, ΔUNEMP +ve 
    
Asset price shock proxies    
 % Return on share indices RET_SHINDX -ve 
 Housing price index (% changes) HPGRW -ve 
    
Other % Change in consumer price index CPIGRW +ve/-ve 
 
 
Table 5. Grouping of drivers of a bank’s CLE into functional groups: bank specific variables 
Functional group Regressor Acronym Expected sign
Bank characteristics (systemic 
importance, market power, risk 
profile) 
Share of system loans SH_SYSLNS +ve/-ve 
 Pricing of risks as measured by net 
interest margins 
NIM +ve/-ve 
    
    
Past credit expansion proxy Growth rate bank assets ASGRW +ve 
    
    
Other variables Cost efficiency: Cost-income ratio 
(level) 
CIR +ve/-ve 
 Income smoothing: Earnings before 
taxes and provisions as % of assets  
EBTP_AS +ve 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics aggregate macro factors (1980 to 2005) 
Acronym Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
CPIGRW_AU 5.0% 4.2% 11.2% 0.2% 3.4% 0.412 1.809 26 
CPIGRW_NZ 6.0% 2.9% 17.1% -0.1% 5.7% 0.977 2.377 26 
GDPGRW_AU 3.3% 3.8% 6.6% -0.7% 1.8% -0.667 3.074 26 
GDPGRW_NZ 2.8% 2.8% 8.5% -1.9% 2.2% 0.277 3.287 26 
HPGRW_AU 8.7% 8.4% 38.8% -4.2% 8.6% 1.508 6.757 26 
HPGRW_NZ 10.1% 8.7% 31.6% -2.5% 8.5% 0.703 3.100 26 
PSCGRW_AU * 12.2% 11.3% 23.9% -1.2% 6.2% -0.120 2.955 26 
PSCGRW_NZ * 12.8% 10.9% 31.0% 4.9% 6.9% 1.182 3.664 26 
RET_SHINDX_AU 9.0% 8.8% 41.5% -26.6% 14.8% -0.019 3.354 26 
RET_SHINDX_NZ 7.5% 6.3% 57.1% -49.5% 20.9% -0.239 4.291 26 
UNEMP_AU 7.6% 7.7% 11.1% 5.1% 1.7% 0.371 2.272 26 
UNEMP_NZ 5.7% 5.5% 10.4% 1.9% 2.3% 0.480 2.556 26 
ΔUNEMP_AU -0.05% -0.49% 3.31% -1.61% 1.14% 1.5534 4.921 26 
ΔUNEMP_NZ 0.08% -0.05% 2.50% -1.80% 1.01% 0.4958 2.906 26 
Notes:  
Series suffices: AU - Australia; NZ -New Zealand 
* PSCGRW are auxiliary series for private sector credit growth, for information. 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics of bank specific series 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs. Cross sect. 
ASGRW 17.0% 14.1% 180.6% -40.1% 19.1% 3.06 21.91 517 32 
CIR 65.0% 65.6% 131.7% 18.0% 12.3% 0.12 5.61 519 31 
EBTP_AS 1.7% 1.6% 17.0% -1.5% 1.1% 7.14 88.87 477 32 
NIM 3.34% 3.06% 11.07% 0.51% 1.43% 1.97 9.18 510 31 
SH_SYSLNS 8.0% 3.4% 34.4% 0.0% 8.3% 0.90 2.79 536 32 
 
 
 
IV Empirical Results 
 
We present estimates of Equation 1 for the combined Australasian sample (Table 8) as well as 
for the Australian and New Zealand sub-samples (Table 9 and Table 10 respectively), each 
estimated using annual data over 1980-2005. All equations are estimated with cross-section fixed 
effects to account for unobserved individual bank characteristics (as in Kearns, 2004). As a 
robustness test, an alternative set of estimates has been run using a random-effects model which 
assumes that the distribution of individual unobserved bank-specific effects does not vary over 
time and can be separately identified in the overall regression. The results of the random effects 
model are not shown but are available on request; they are very similar to those for the fixed 
effects specification. All reported t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors (degrees of 
freedom corrected) to correct for the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (White, 
1980). 
 
Results for aggregate macro factors 
As shown in Table 8, GDP growth (GDPPGRW) and both the change and level of the 
unemployment rate (UNEMP, ΔUNEMP) have the expected effects on a bank’s annual loan loss 
provisions with a lag of one year. Based on the Schwarz and Akaike information criteria, the 
unemployment rate based model shows greatest explanatory power. This corresponds to results 
found by Kearns (2004, p. 118) for a smaller and shorter sample of Irish banks. He concludes 
that the unemployment rate is the most significant macroeconomic factor affecting the rate of 
provisioning. 
 
In our study, a sustained one percentage point increase in GDP growth results in an 
annualised decline in IAE_LN of 11%; alternatively, a sustained one percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate results in a 26% rise in IAE_LN. It is difficult to compare these 
sensitivities to results of other studies due to differences in model design (e.g. alternative 
dependent CLE variables and different variable transformations). The sensitivities in Australasia 
nonetheless seem lower with regard to GDP growth compared with the international studies of 
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Bikker & Hu (2001, Table 3, p. 12) for banks from 29 countries from 1979-1999 and Valckx 
(2004, Table 1, p. 7) with data drawn from OECD bank profitability statistics for all 15 EU 
countries from 1979 to 2001. 
 
As to country-specific differences between Australia and New Zealand, Australia’s 
estimation results show much greater sensitivity to GDP growth (see Table 9). The New Zealand 
results are less significant and effects of GDP, ΔUNEMP and UNEMP seem more delayed (see 
Table 10). 
 
The contemporaneous return on the national share index (RET_SHINDX) is significantly 
negative for the overall sample and for Australian banks. It is slightly less significant for New 
Zealand banks but shows the expected negative sign. It has greater explanatory power than 
growth of the housing price index (HPGRW), the alternative asset market proxy. HPGRW also 
shows the negative coefficients for the overall sample but only the contemporaneous term of 
HPGRW shows some significance for the Australian sub-sample. 
 
Coefficients for the growth of CPI (CPIGRW) show mostly positive signs but with limited 
significance. Contemporaneous effects are minimal but effects become larger with longer lags. 
This pattern is more pronounced for the Australian sub-sample (Table 9) with negative 
(sometimes significant) contemporaneous coefficients and positive (mostly significant) one-year 
lagged terms. This implies that higher inflation, while possibly yielding a temporary 
improvement of asset quality (Tommasi, 1994), leads to a longer term deterioration of credit 
quality. These results are consistent with research that generally postulates long term costs of 
inflation (e.g. Lucas, 2000). 
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Table 8. Estimation results of model Equation 1 (full sample) 
Equation 1 - Full 
Sample 1 t-Stat
p
o
s 2 t-Stat
p
o
s 3 t-Stat
Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group ALL ALL ALL
Start Year 1980 1980 1980
End Year 2005 2005 2005
Constant -0.0241 ** -3.33 -0.0256 ** -3.71 -0.0289 ** -4.27
GDPGRW -0.0345 -0.84     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.0572 -1.49     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0178 -0.47     
ΔUNEMP   -0.0376 -0.43   
ΔUNEMP(-1)   0.2442 ** 3.76   
ΔUNEMP(-2)   0.0519 1.04   
UNEMP     -0.0052 -0.05
UNEMP(-1)     0.3128 ** 2.69
UNEMP(-2)     -0.2277 ** -3.34
RET_SHINDX -0.0122 * -2.05 -0.0144 * -2.34 -0.0151 * -2.37
RET_SHINDX(-1) -0.0023 -0.49 -0.0017 -0.33 -0.0006 -0.12
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0054 0.83 0.0085 1.23 0.0072 1.10
HPGRW -0.0146 -1.27 -0.0190 -1.86 -0.0188 -1.80
HPGRW(-1) -0.0021 -0.31 -0.0045 -0.61 -0.0003 -0.04
HPGRW(-2) -0.0031 -0.42 0.0056 0.79 0.0084 1.03
CPIGRW -0.0126 -0.31 0.0005 0.01 0.0022 0.05
CPIGRW(-1) 0.0391 0.61 0.0641 1.22 0.0690 1.33
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0549 * 2.04 0.0167 0.63 0.0251 0.90
SH_SYSLNS 0.0512 * 2.19 0.0511 * 2.28 0.0552 * 2.46
NIM -0.1819 -1.40 -0.1619 -1.24 -0.2150 -1.50
NIM(-1) 0.0864 0.65 0.0764 0.57 0.0898 0.66
NIM(-2) -0.2285 * -2.14 -0.2233 * -2.14 -0.2286 * -2.18
CIR 0.0635 ** 4.69 0.0635 ** 4.65 0.0597 ** 4.14
CIR(-1) -0.0063 -0.45 -0.0080 -0.57 -0.0085 -0.59
CIR(-2) -0.0184 -1.93 -0.0193 * -2.02 -0.0202 * -2.17
EBTP_AS 1.0493 ** 9.79 1.0481 ** 10.16 1.0619 ** 10.18
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.2112 * -2.12 -0.2148 * -2.19 -0.2042 * -2.11
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.1604 -1.64 -0.1719 -1.73 -0.1646 -1.65
ASGRW -0.0027 -1.09 -0.0028 -1.10 -0.0030 -1.18
ASGRW(-1) -0.0009 -0.44 -0.0015 -0.73 -0.0016 -0.74
ASGRW(-2) 0.0036 1.48 0.0034 1.45 0.0033 1.43
ASGRW(-3) 0.0046 * 2.38 0.0042 * 2.17 0.0040 * 2.12
ASGRW(-4) 0.0069 ** 2.93 0.0068 ** 2.75 0.0067 ** 2.62
Cross-sections included 28 28 28
Observations 362 362 362
Adjusted R^2 0.740 0.748 0.749
F-Statistics 20.021 ** 20.831 ** 20.900 **
Schwarz criterion -6.057 -6.088 -6.091
Akaike info criterion -6.649 -6.680 -6.682
Durbin-Watson stat 2.102 2.119 2.136  
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level. 
Estimation for full observation period 1980 to 2005 for common sample 
of Australian and New Zealand banks. Dependent variable is impaired 
asset expense as % of loans (IAE_LN). Explanatory variables as defined 
in Table 4 and Table 5. All equations estimated with cross-section fixed 
effects. All t-statistics use White diagonal standard errors & covariance 
(d.f. corrected) 
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Table 9 Estimation results of model Equation 1 (Australian banks) 
Equation 1 - 
Australia 1 t-Stat
p
o
s 2 t-Stat
p
o
s 3 t-Stat
Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group AU AU AU
Start Year 1980 1980 1980
End Year 2005 2005 2005
Constant -0.0196 * -2.50 -0.0259 ** -3.32 -0.0337 ** -3.83
GDPGRW -0.2227 ** -3.52     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.1242 * -2.41     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0749 -1.78     
ΔUNEMP   0.1300 1.02   
ΔUNEMP(-1)   0.2623 ** 2.82   
ΔUNEMP(-2)   0.1525 * 2.11   
UNEMP     0.1199 0.60
UNEMP(-1)     0.2666 1.40
UNEMP(-2)     -0.2763 * -2.37
RET_SHINDX -0.0181 ** -3.52 -0.0221 ** -3.83 -0.0224 ** -3.49
RET_SHINDX(-1) 0.0168 * 2.14 0.0113 1.27 0.0098 0.97
RET_SHINDX(-2) 0.0296 ** 3.37 0.0274 ** 3.39 0.0181 * 2.39
HPGRW -0.0378 ** -3.03 -0.0449 ** -4.33 -0.0371 ** -3.51
HPGRW(-1) 0.0165 1.71 0.0046 0.34 0.0107 0.52
HPGRW(-2) 0.0134 1.64 0.0081 0.95 0.0133 1.29
CPIGRW -0.1519 ** -2.78 -0.0740 -1.70 -0.0544 -1.36
CPIGRW(-1) 0.1062 1.62 0.1280 ** 2.93 0.0953 * 2.36
CPIGRW(-2) -0.0314 -0.87 -0.0541 -1.72 -0.0303 -0.96
SH_SYSLNS 0.0289 1.44 0.0352 1.76 0.0397 * 1.99
NIM -0.1128 -0.58 -0.1390 -0.73 -0.1509 -0.76
NIM(-1) 0.1059 0.45 0.0792 0.31 0.0848 0.33
NIM(-2) -0.2163 -1.21 -0.2420 -1.26 -0.2595 -1.31
CIR 0.0755 ** 6.01 0.0712 ** 5.74 0.0680 ** 5.15
CIR(-1) -0.0053 -0.48 -0.0093 -0.83 -0.0079 -0.66
CIR(-2) -0.0183 -1.75 -0.0187 -1.89 -0.0197 * -2.01
EBTP_AS 1.0186 ** 7.31 1.0479 ** 7.66 1.0569 ** 7.29
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.4578 ** -3.53 -0.4206 ** -3.21 -0.4098 ** -3.05
EBTP_AS(-2) 0.0745 0.69 0.0742 0.66 0.0643 0.57
ASGRW -0.0006 -0.23 -0.0007 -0.28 -0.0015 -0.56
ASGRW(-1) -0.0017 -0.56 -0.0031 -1.08 -0.0027 -0.97
ASGRW(-2) 0.0071 ** 2.91 0.0059 * 2.38 0.0059 * 2.42
ASGRW(-3) 0.0058 ** 2.73 0.0045 * 2.10 0.0044 * 2.05
ASGRW(-4) 0.0084 ** 3.04 0.0080 * 2.59 0.0081 * 2.35
Cross-sections included 19 19 19
Observations 236 236 236
Adjusted R^2 0.722 0.723 0.721
F-Statistics 14.581 ** 14.624 ** 14.496 **
Schwarz criterion -6.159 -6.162 -6.155
Akaike info criterion -6.834 -6.837 -6.830
Durbin-Watson stat 2.170 2.195 2.185  
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Estimation for full observation period 1980 to 2005 for Australian banks.  
Dependent variable is impaired asset expense as % of loans (IAE_LN). 
Explanatory variables as defined in Table 4 and Table 5. All equations 
estimated with cross-section fixed effects. All t-statistics use White 
diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
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Table 10. Estimation results of model Equation 1 (New Zealand banks) 
Equation 1 - New 
Zealand 1 t-Stat
p
o
s 2 t-Stat
p
o
s 3 t-Stat
Independent IAE_LN IAE_LN IAE_LN
Sample Group NZ NZ NZ
Start Year 1980 1980 1980
End Year 2005 2005 2005
Constant -0.0128 -1.22 -0.0149 -1.51 -0.0173 -1.86
GDPGRW 0.0583 0.84     
GDPGRW(-1) -0.0204 -0.40     
GDPGRW(-2) -0.0932 -1.48     
ΔUNEMP  -0.2209 -1.13
ΔUNEMP(-1)  0.0926 0.87
ΔUNEMP(-2)  0.1316 1.42
UNEMP     -0.1741 -0.96
UNEMP(-1)     0.3806 1.69
UNEMP(-2)     -0.0776 -0.64
RET_SHINDX -0.0162 -1.77 -0.0180 -1.86 -0.0193 -1.86
RET_SHINDX(-1) -0.0077 -1.50 -0.0050 -0.88 -0.0045 -0.80
RET_SHINDX(-2) -0.0019 -0.30 0.0004 0.06 -0.0017 -0.27
HPGRW -0.0121 -0.68 -0.0059 -0.39 -0.0091 -0.56
HPGRW(-1) 0.0150 0.90 0.0080 0.56 0.0154 0.86
HPGRW(-2) -0.0010 -0.07 -0.0036 -0.26 -0.0019 -0.12
CPIGRW 0.0105 0.18 -0.0585 -0.60 -0.0408 -0.43
CPIGRW(-1) 0.1183 1.18 0.1392 1.40 0.1518 1.39
CPIGRW(-2) 0.0617 1.33 0.1039 1.35 0.1079 1.37
SH_SYSLNS 0.0468 1.19 0.0483 1.24 0.0472 1.21
NIM -0.1971 -0.63 -0.2637 -0.93 -0.3209 -1.21
NIM(-1) -0.0889 -0.53 -0.0521 -0.33 -0.0001 0.00
NIM(-2) -0.2016 -1.45 -0.2175 -1.50 -0.2391 -1.53
CIR 0.0742 ** 4.45 0.0753 ** 4.40 0.0642 ** 3.06
CIR(-1) -0.0453 -1.55 -0.0435 -1.57 -0.0439 -1.57
CIR(-2) -0.0043 -0.25 -0.0066 -0.39 -0.0084 -0.51
EBTP_AS 0.9044 ** 3.75 0.9304 ** 4.19 0.9460 ** 4.28
EBTP_AS(-1) -0.2540 * -2.04 -0.2286 -1.96 -0.2296 -1.95
EBTP_AS(-2) -0.3027 * -2.39 -0.2869 * -2.40 -0.2927 * -2.38
ASGRW -0.0016 -0.26 -0.0023 -0.38 -0.0012 -0.21
ASGRW(-1) 0.0048 1.00 0.0048 0.97 0.0061 1.14
ASGRW(-2) -0.0012 -0.28 0.0003 0.08 0.0007 0.16
ASGRW(-3) 0.0045 0.86 0.0014 0.26 0.0022 0.44
ASGRW(-4) 0.0017 0.44 0.0037 0.85 0.0062 1.20
Cross-sections included 9 9 9
Observations 126 126 126
Adjusted R^2 0.795 0.799 0.798
F-Statistics 14.874 ** 15.162 ** 15.069 **
Schwarz criterion -5.601 -5.617 -5.612
Akaike info criterion -6.411 -6.428 -6.423
Durbin-Watson stat 2.090 2.042 2.052  
Notes: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level 
Estimation for full observation period 1980 to 2005 for New Zealand 
banks.  Dependent variable is impaired asset expense as % of loans 
(IAE_LN). Explanatory variables as defined in Table 4 and Table 5. All 
equations estimated with cross-section fixed effects. All t-statistics use 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
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Results for bank-specific factors 
The size proxy, SH_SYSLNS, defined as the bank’s share of system loans, is consistently 
positive and significant for all full sample estimates, indicating higher levels of provisioning for 
larger banks. The coefficient values are not generally significant at conventional levels, however, 
for the country sub-samples. This may reflect structural heterogeneity of the sample as smaller 
banks are predominantly housing lenders with comparably lower levels of provisioning 
requirements.
12
  It may also reflect the market power hypothesis which postulates that 
monopolistic market structure promotes lending by larger banks to young firms which leads to 
higher credit losses (Petersen & Rajan, 1995).  
 
The coefficients for the net interest margin (NIM) are generally negative for the 
contemporaneous and twice-lagged terms (with the latter consistently significant for the full 
sample estimates). This is consistent with our initial expectation that larger banks tend to exhibit 
lower interest rate margins (as indicated by a negative and significant correlation of -22% 
between SH_SYSLNS and NIM). Larger banks derive a higher portion of their profit through 
off-balance sheet business while smaller players rely more on lending income.  
 
Highly significant contemporaneous coefficients of the cost-income ratio proxies (CIR) and 
generally negative coefficients for lagged terms indicate that high and increasing cost-income 
ratios (lower operational efficiencies) are associated with higher levels of impaired assets. The 
results lend support to the hypothesis that operational problems at banks (high CIR) go hand in 
hand with poor credit risk management and thus higher loan losses. Conversely, the results reject 
the alternative theory which postulates that extensive costly monitoring (high CIR) leads to better 
asset quality (i.e. negative coefficient for CIR). Our results for CIR support Berger & De Young 
(1997) who found “cost efficiencies to precede reductions in problem loans”. The results are also 
generally in line with Salas & Saurina (2002, Table 2, p. 218) who find positive, but not always 
significant coefficients.  
 
Estimates in Table 8 show consistently positive relationships between the level of 
provisioning and the banks’ contemporaneous pre-provision earnings (EBTP_AS), confirming 
previous results for other markets supportive of an income smoothing pattern (e.g. Greenawalt & 
Sinkey Jr., 1988 for US; Arpa et al., 2001, p. 107 for Austria; Bikker & Hu, 2001 for 26 OECD 
countries; Cavallo & Majnoni, 2001 for G10 countries; Bikker & Metzemakers, 2003 for US, 
EU; Kearns, 2004 for Ireland). Lagged terms of EBTP_AS show negative and often significant 
                                                 
12
 Recall that our estimates exclude a proxy for the share of residential mortgage loans in a bank’s 
portfolio, since this data is only available after 1990. 
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coefficients which support the theory that necessary provisions are postponed into the following 
year if earnings are low in that particular time period. These results are consistent across the 
Australian and New Zealand sub-samples although Australian institutions seem to postpone 
required provisions for shorter periods than do New Zealand banks which smooth over longer 
cycles. One could hypothesize that Australian banks, which are mostly exchange listed, have less 
discretion in smoothing income compared to their (mostly) non-listed (or subsidiary) New 
Zealand counterparts. 
 
Signs and significance of the coefficients on asset growth (ASGRW) are affected by the 
lags considered. Contemporaneous growth appears to be associated with lower credit losses 
(negative coefficients) but this effect is very weak. On the other hand, terms lagged beyond 2 
years have the expected unfavourable effect (significant positive coefficient), especially for the 
full and Australian samples. Both results support the notion that at the time of credit expansion, 
management has a too optimistic judgment of the risks associated with their strategy, an 
assessment which has to be corrected in subsequent years. 
 
These findings appear to explain some of the controversy in the literature regarding the 
effect of past credit growth as prior studies have typically included just one or two lags of the 
growth parameter. Pain (2003, p. 29), for instance, discovered negative (albeit small) coefficients 
for his one-period lagged growth proxy. Likewise Cavallo & Majnoni (2001, p. 20) find the 
contemporaneous loan growth rate has a negative sign implying that provisions tend to decrease 
as a share of total assets when the rate of new lending increases. Both studies have apparently 
measured associations of current lending growth with provisioning as opposed to measuring the 
longer term impact of banks ‘buying market share’ at the expense of subsequent asset quality. 
 
Our results are in some respects similar to Salas & Saurina (2002, Table 2, p. 218) who 
also study lags up to 4 years and generally find negative coefficients for shorter lags but positive 
coefficients for longer lags of asset and branch network growth. While partially significant, their 
results are less clear-cut since they use an alternative CLE proxy in the form of a level variable 
‘problem loan ratio’, which roughly corresponds to the level of impaired assets in Australasian 
accounting terminology. This level variable is likely to provide a blurred picture of the credit 
events in a particular period since the level of impaired assets will be the consequence of loan 
defaults and debt workouts possibly many years back. Our use of impaired asset expenses (i.e. 
the flow of new provisioning) as dependent variable yields more clear-cut results than the use by 
Salas & Saurina of the stock of provisions. 
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V Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study identifies the major drivers of credit losses in the Australasian banking system. 
Despite the importance of the topic, little such research has been conducted previously for this 
region. The analysis has been made possible as a result of the compilation of a dataset of 
financial and credit loss data for 32 Australasian banks over a period of 1980 to 2005 from bank 
documents. We choose impaired asset expense as a percentage of loans as the dependent variable 
in a pooled regression model. This variable that has been widely used in comparable studies and 
is available consistently throughout the observation period.  
 
Explanatory variables include aggregate variables proxying the state of the economy as 
well as asset price shock proxies for share and housing market performance. The impacts of these 
macro variables are as expected, with the rate of unemployment having greatest explanatory 
power. With respect to asset prices, the return on the share index has a more significant effect on 
credit losses than property prices. This result reflects the major banking crisis in Australasia 
around 1990 which was primarily associated with asset shocks emanating from the corporate and 
commercial sector rather than from the housing market. Our results indicate that higher consumer 
price inflation may have some small initial cushioning effect on provisioning, but longer term 
provisioning rises as inflation increases.  
 
Bank-specific variables are included to control for institution-specific characteristics. We 
find that larger banks and banks with wider net interest margins have, on average, lower levels of 
credit losses. Bank inefficiency as measured by the cost-income ratio is generally associated with 
greater credit losses. This means inefficient institutions do not spend their extra resources 
efficiently on extensive credit monitoring; rather their high cost-income ratios are a reflection of 
poor management and control. 
 
Important results are found with respect to the effect of past bank credit expansion. We find 
significantly greater asset quality problems for fast expanding banks with a lag of 2 to 4 years. 
Our findings provide strong evidence that managers opting for quick growth do not accurately 
gauge the provisioning requirements associated with their strategy. 
 
Finally, the coefficients for the contemporaneous pre-tax & provision earnings proxy are 
consistently positive and significant for all samples considered. Managers of Australasian banks 
thus apparently have employed discretionary elements of impaired asset expense for the purpose 
of achieving certain target earnings. In particular, they seem to increase provisions in good years 
‘to store’ earnings for potentially lean years in future.  
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Our results are similar for both the Australian and New Zealand sub-samples. Likewise 
they are broadly consistent with findings for other geographic areas. In detail, however, there are 
differences; for example, with regard to the timing of the effects. This means that, while the 
general impacts might be similar, the actual transmission mechanism is subject to specific local 
influences. Continued research on drivers of bank credit losses in Australasia may usefully 
consider structural modelling approaches that help to further understand the channels of 
influence and timing of the particular factors considered here. 
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